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Abstract—Context: Poor usability of cryptographic APIs is a
severe source of vulnerabilities. Aim: We wanted to find out
what kind of cryptographic libraries are present in Rust and
how usable they are. Method: We explored Rust’s cryptographic
libraries through a systematic search, conducted an exploratory
study on the major libraries and a controlled experiment on
two of these libraries with 28 student participants. Results:
Only half of the major libraries explicitly focus on usability
and misuse resistance, which is reflected in their current APIs.
We found that participants were more successful using rust-
crypto which we considered less usable than ring before the
experiment. Conclusion: We discuss API design insights and
make recommendations for the design of crypto libraries in
Rust regarding the detail and structure of the documentation,
higher-level APIs as wrappers for the existing low-level libraries,
and selected, good-quality example code to improve the emerging
cryptographic libraries of Rust.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rust is a systems programming language sponsored by
Mozilla and was voted the most loved programming language
in the 2016 StackOverflow developer survey [1]. It rivals other
systems programming languages like C or C++ and despite
being only seven years old with its first stable release in May
2015, Rust has already been used by Mozilla to build parts of
the Firefox browser [2]. Apart from speed and concurrency,
one of its main goals is safety, mostly achieved through an
innovative memory management concept that makes it suit-
able for developing security-critical applications. In particular
cryptographic libraries and services are thus likely to become
widely used in Rust.
Many applications that use encryption or other crypto-
graphic services end up being vulnerable because their de-
velopers knowingly or unknowingly misuse cryptographic
libraries [3, 4, 5, 6]. While the cryptographic algorithms
themselves may not contain severe bugs, their application
programming interfaces (APIs) are not resistant to misuse and
in some cases they are very difficult to use at all without
detailed cryptographic knowledge. Such detailed knowledge
cannot be expected from application programmers, as it is an
integral part of software engineering to break down complex
problems into smaller problems such that the person solving
one of them does not need detailed knowledge of the other
solutions. Therefore, many researchers have called for more
usable and misuse-resistant crypto APIs [6, 7, 8, 9] and many
make concrete recommendations for usable API designs [10,
11, 12].
The established crypto libraries such as OpenSSL cannot
make significant changes to their APIs for compatibility
reasons. Consequently, new libraries with a strong focus on
API usability have been developed. Notable examples include
NaCl, its offspring libsodium, Keyczar and the Python library
cryptography.io.
Several major crypto libraries already exist in Rust including
wrappers for OpenSSL (e.g. rust-openssl) and libsodium, some
plain-Rust implementations like rust-crypto and a BoringSSL-
based library called ring.
We see that cryptographic libraries often have usability
problems. This work aims for analyzing how usable and
misuse-resistant Rusts major crypto libraries are and how they
have to be improved. We ask the following research questions:
RQ 1: Which are the major cryptographic libraries in Rust?
RQ 2: How usable are the current Rust cryptographic li-
braries?
To answer these research questions, we first conducted a
systematic search for Rust crypto libraries. Next we per-
formed an exploratory study on the major crypto libraries
and their usability. Following that, we conducted a controlled
experiment with two of the major libraries. From these we
gathered insights and derived recommendations for improving
the usability which we present at the end.
We contribute the following:
• Empirical insights into beginner usage and usability prob-
lems of Rust’s cryptographic libraries.
• Recommendations for the design of cryptographic li-
braries in Rust to help improve their usability and misuse
resistance.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, the Research question RQ 1
(Which are the major cryptographic libraries in Rust?) has
not been answered scientifically. In comparison, usability is a
common research area. Therefore, we describe related work
for the usability of cryptography APIs.
There are large bodies of literature regarding API design,
API usability and crypto usability (e.g. the usability of en-
cryption facilities by end-users). The usability of crypto APIs
lies at their intersection, as it is fundamentally about making
APIs easy to use and misuse-resistant but it also involves
the same difficulty that cryptography is especially hard to
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understand and API users should not be faced with security-
critical decisions unless it is unavoidable and they have been
made aware of the consequences.
Georgiev et al. [3] analyzed SSL certificate validation
code in a range of applications and found that the libraries
themselves are correct “for the most part” but developers
often misunderstand the APIs which is the “primary cause” for
vulnerabilities. Egele et al. [5] automatically checked Android
apps and found widespread security flaws such as ECB mode,
constant keys, constant salts and constant pseudorandom num-
ber generator (PRNG) seeds, all of which can be traced
back to a misuse of the cryptographic APIs in Android. Like
many others, they proposed to get rid of insecure defaults
(the ECB mode in Java’s Cipher.getInstance(), for
example) to increase misuse resistance, they recommended
improving the API documentation and they proposed to build
APIs which enforce their semantic contracts by means of the
API itself. Lazar et al. [6] investigated 269 vulnerabilities
from the CVE database and found that the majority is caused
by application code which misuses the properly implemented
cryptographic libraries. Das and King [7] defined seven prop-
erties to determine how safe a cryptographic library is and
applied them to six libraries for the most popular programming
languages. Nadi et al. [8] empirically investigated the Java
Cryptography Architecture (JCA) by analyzing StackOverflow
posts, GitHub repositories and surveying developers. They
found that the APIs are perceived as being too low-level and
recommended task-based API (similar to the cryptography.io
library) and improved documentation as solutions. Acar et al.
[13] compared the usability of cryptographic Python libraries
in a controlled experiment with several tasks in an online
environment. They found that simplicity is not enough, the
documentation must be adequate as well. [10] developed 10
“principles for creating usable and secure crypto APIs” which
are more or less directly applicable to Rust crypto libraries.
On a more technical level, Forler, Lucks, and Wenzel [12]
demonstrated how the Ada language and compiler can be
used to design an API that prevents nonce reuse and plaintext
leaks. Similar constructions could be possible in Rust. There
is no academic work regarding the usability of Rust crypto
APIs but Devlin [14] gave a related talk at a community
Meetup which was recorded. He mentions Too Many Choices,
Unsafe Defaults, Unauthenticated Encryption, IV / Nonce
Selection, In-SecureRandom, API Gaps and Password Hash
as problematic topics. We want to address this research gap
with findings from our exploratory study and a controlled
experiment, both on the usability of the cryptographic libraries.
While Rust is a programming language gaining importance
and being particularly suitable for crypto libraries, to the best
of our knowledge, there has been no investigation of Rust’s
crypto libraries.
III. EXISTING LIBRARIES
Before we analyzed the usability of Rust’s crypto libraries,
we had to identify them and determined which are the most
important ones.
To answer RQ 1 (Which are the major cryptographic
libraries in Rust?), we used a systematic search approach
to explore the population of Rust libraries, starting from the
following places:
• Reddit thread “What crypto library do y’all use?”1,
• the crypto and cryptography keywords on crates.io,
• the “Cryptography” collection on libs.rs2,
• the crypto and cryptography topics on GitHub,
• an overview on arewewebyet.org3,
• asking on the #rust-crypto IRC channel on the Mozilla
IRC network.
Retracted libraries (with “yanked” crates4) were excluded. For
every identified library, we also looked at other GitHub repos-
itories of the main developers and found a few more libraries.
As we intended to investigate and compare their usability,
we grouped libraries that offer similar functionality. We first
grouped them by the level of the provided algorithms and then
subdivided the primitive level to split off smaller libraries with
specific purposes from the larger, general-purpose libraries
which we analyze in the remainder of this paper. Through
our search, we found the following 81 libraries:
• 10 crypto-specific utility libraries for constant-time oper-
ations, secret memory and similar.
• 13 larger libraries which offer multiple primitives and
usually multiple algorithms per primitive. The implemen-
tations are either written in Rust or attached through
wrappers to code in another language. The major libraries
in this category are introduced in section III-A.
• 35 libraries which implement a single primitive, algo-
rithm or a small family of them in Rust.
• 5 libraries which offer a simpler interface to other imple-
mentations for specific application scenarios.
• 18 libraries that implement cryptosystems or protocols
(mostly Transport Layer Security (TLS)) and usually
depend on lower-level libraries.
We determined major libraries semi-manually: Any library
with 20 or more dependent crates is considered a major library.
We also added octavo because it implements multiple crypto-
graphic primitives directly in Rust instead of wrapping another
implementation and we included rust_sodium and RustCrypto
– two forks of sodiumoxide and rust-crypto, respectively – in
some of our analyses. All major libraries fall in the “multiple
primitives” category.
A. Major libraries for primitives
Please see table I for an overview of the major Rust crypto
libraries in chronological order. By far the oldest library is
rust-openssl and like the wrapped C library OpenSSL, it
offers both primitives and a TLS implementation. Its age and
its double role explain the overall high number of commits,
downloads and dependent crates. It is also the only library
for primitives developed by a member of the official Rust
1https://reddit.com/4d8hxm
2http://libs.rs/cryptography/
3http://www.arewewebyet.org/topics/crypto/
4Crates are Rust’s compilation units (like packages).
TABLE I
KEY DATA OF MAJOR RUST CRYPTO LIBRARIES (AS OF 2 JUNE 2018)
Name rust-openssl rust-crypto sodiumoxide octavo ring rust_sodium RustCrypto
Based on OpenSSL (plain Rust) libsodium (plain Rust) BoringSSL sodiumoxide rust-crypto
Started Dec 2011 Sep 2013 Dec 2013 Jul 2015 Sep 2015 Aug 2016 Oct 2016
Last commit ongoing Sep 2016 ongoing Oct 2017 ongoing Jun 2018 ongoing
Last release ongoing May 2016 ongoing Apr 2016 ongoing May 2018 ongoing
Commits 2,325 753 534 290 8,490 (4,762) 169 93
Contributors 167 49 41 11 128 (78) 22 5
Downloads 1,763,450 662,891 95,258 1,053 323,635 23,049 <20,000
Downloads (60d) 268,753 49,450 11,822 40 68,404 2,106 (unclear)
GitHub stars 372 725 313 123 865 45 21
Dependent crates 150 178 47 0 95 14 9+
API level medium low high medium-low medium-high high low
library team (@sfackler). There has been a major overhaul
in 2016 with about as many contributions as in all previous
years combined.
Two projects aim to implement the most relevant cryp-
tographic primitives natively in Rust, to eventually become
an alternative to the established crypto libraries in C. The
older project is rust-crypto which is the second most popular
crypto library after rust-openssl and the newer one is octavo
which is still incomplete and insecure. Both libraries have
APIs that grew directly on top of the algorithms instead of
another library’s interface, resulting in relatively low-level
APIs. Development on both has stalled since 2016, though
there is a recent effort to revive and modularize rust-crypto
under the GitHub organization RustCrypto. Because of this
modularization, the statistics of RustCrypto could not be
determined exactly (see table I).
sodiumoxide is a more usable wrapper API around the
Rust bindings for libsodium. The functions and primitives
offered by libsodium are rather high-level and originate from
Daniel Bernstein’s NaCl library. Like the underlying libraries,
sodiumoxide is designed for usability and misuse resistance.
rust_sodium is a fork of sodiumoxide that improves the build
system and a few other things, making it easier to use
especially on Windows, though it is not as actively maintained.
A relatively new library that aspires to provide even more
usable and misuse-resistant APIs is ring. It uses a slimmed-
down code base of BoringSSL, Google’s simplified OpenSSL
fork and excludes the entire TLS stack and most deprecated al-
gorithms. The API is developed independently of the underly-
ing Assembler/C code and notable efforts and innovations are
made regarding misuse resistance. Because ring is technically
a fork of BoringSSL, all contributions to BoringSSL are also
counted towards ring’s statistics. The numbers in parentheses
in table I quantify the contributions to ring that are not present
in the upstream project. Even after these subtractions, ring still
has by far the highest number of commits and quite many
contributors considering its young age.
B. Discussion
Rust has surprisingly many and manifold cryptographic
libraries. It seems that several programmers implement a
small (crypto) project to explore and learn the Rust language.
To answer RQ 1: Our systematic search identified seven
major libraries that provide a range of relevant cryptographic
primitives. The next question now is how usable these libraries
are and whether we can offer suggestions for improvement.
IV. EXPLORATORY STUDY
In this section we describe an exploratory study with the
major libraries to provide the first answers to RQ 2.
The second author of this paper (hereinafter called explorer)
conducted an exploratory study to test several usability aspects
of the existing crypto libraries: documentation, structure of
the API, function signatures and misuse resistance. As a Rust
beginner with significant programming experience in other
languages and basic cryptographic knowledge, he completed
a Rust tutorial and then started the exploratory study. It was
conducted using the latest versions of the major libraries
introduced in the previous section (see table I) in November
2016 and some of the uncovered issues have been fixed in
the meantime. Note that RustCrypto did not exist at the time
and sodiumoxide had the same API as rust_sodium but failed
to build on Windows, so only rust_sodium was used. The
explorer used cargo and rustc version 1.12.1 and IntelliJ IDEA
with the intellij-rust plugin which provides code completion
and navigation.
The exploratory study consisted of four stages designed to
cover the most important APIs (hashing, HMAC, symmetric
encryption, authenticated encryption (AE) and key manage-
ment).
A. Task
A code skeleton was implemented before the actual explo-
ration. That application spawns two threads, one (the server)
opens a TCP port and the other (the client) connects. Then
the client sends a string, the server confirms with a simple
“1” and shuts down, the client waits for the confirmation to
arrive and also shuts down causing the main thread to exit.
In the first stage, the respective crypto library was used to
(i) generate a symmetric encryption key and load it into both
threads,
(ii) encrypt (and decrypt) the string sent across the TCP
connection and
(iii) replace the simple confirmation with a hash value that
has to match.
In the second stage, the encryption was replaced with
authenticated encryption (AE). If the implementation from the
first stage already had used AE or if no AE ciphers were
available in the library, a different algorithm of the same type
was chosen to test their substitutability.
In the third stage, the hash function was replaced with an
HMAC using the same key as for the encryption. This is not
recommendable from a cryptography point of view but it does
not affect this exploration about API usability.
In the fourth stage, the protocol was kept unchanged but the
received authenticators (the AE cipher’s tag and the HMAC
digest) were tampered with, simply by incrementing one of
their bytes at the receiving end. The application’s reaction to
such a simulated attack was observed and a few alternative
ways to call the API were investigated to find out how easily
an invalid authenticator could remain unnoticed.
Depending on the encryption cipher, a nonce and/or an au-
thentication tag needed to be sent to the server separately. The
corresponding code was only developed once and copied for
later explorations. Regarding the comparison of authenticators,
it was evaluated how the libraries promoted or enforced the
use of constant-time comparison functions.5
B. rust-crypto
Version 0.2.36 was used for the exploratory study.
Documentation: The documentation is partly detailed (e.g.
for hashing), partly sparse (e.g. for HMAC) and partly nonex-
istent. Unfortunately, the symmetric encryption APIs are not
documented at all but there is a code example6 for AES-CBC
in the repository (the only one).
Signatures: The API for AES-CBC requires the caller
to feed the input and output through custom buffer types
and react dynamically to buffer overflows or underflows.
Considering the task at hand (encrypt a string entirely), the
API is extremely low-level and difficult to understand, so
that the explorer just copied the code example and used the
higher-level API provided there. The AE, hashing and HMAC
functions were relatively straightforward to use.
API structure: Block, stream and authenticated ciphers use
entirely different APIs, as do hashing and HMAC. They are
not independent, though, as rust-crypto’s API design cleverly
integrates elements in a way that makes sense from an
implementation perspective: the Hmac<D> takes a hashing
algorithm (digest) D as a parameter, for example. The same
concept is applied throughout the library, e.g., the generic
CTR mode implementation can be used with any block cipher.
5At the time of the exploration, the explorer was not aware that the
regular comparison functions (==) are insecure for these purposes—like most
developers with only basic cryptographic knowledge. This evaluation was
therefore done several months later.
6https://github.com/DaGenix/rust-crypto/blob/b6e3294/examples/
symmetriccipher.rs
Hence, the trait-based API is not designed for ease of use or
misuse resistance but to appropriately reflect the underlying
algorithms and to make them composable and interoperable.
Misuse resistance: The HMAC API returns a custom struct
which overrides the == operator so that comparisons are
performed in constant time. When the authentication tag is
tampered with, the decrypt () function returns false . The
return value can be ignored without any compiler warnings
but no harm is done because the function does not yield the
encrypted plaintext unless the verification was successful.
C. ring
Version 0.5.3 was used for the exploratory study.
Documentation: The documentation is brief but complete.
Most parts of the library have a code example, though the
difficult AE API does not (yet).
Signatures: The encryption API requires allocating extra
space for the authentication tag in the vector that is used for
both input and output and finally truncating the result to the
length returned from the encryption function. This API slowed
the explorer down but did not result in any bugs or other
problems. On the plus side, it saves the caller the trouble of
dealing with a separate authentication tag. The hashing and
HMAC APIs were easy to use.
API structure: There is one top-level module per primitive
and all modules are structured similarly. In particular, they
all provide top-level global functions for the main operations.
Thus substituting the AES-GCM algorithm with a ChaCha20-
Poly1305 was straightforward.
Misuse resistance: ring exclusively offers authenticated
kinds of encryption which prevent accidental misuse of
unauthenticated encryption. The HMAC module provides
a verify () function that uses a constant-time comparison.
Though its use is not enforced and there are no warnings on
the getter for the raw digest data, the symmetrical design of
the module and the code example strongly encourage using it.
Tampering with the tag or digest produces errors in the return
values of the decryption or verification functions and ignoring
these return values leads to compiler warnings.
D. rust-openssl
Version 0.9.1 was used for the exploratory study. The
exploration had been started with 0.9.0 but initial attempts
to use the AES-GCM cipher failed because the wrapper API
was not designed for AE ciphers. The library owner added the
missing code within a few hours.7
Documentation: The library is partly documented but the
documentation neither guides nor educates the user. For ex-
ample, it does not explain which ciphers need a nonce or how
long the nonces/keys need to be. The explorer struggled to
find the HMAC implementation because the top-level docu-
mentation is mostly empty, there is no module named hmac
and a documentation search leads to the pkey::PKey::hmac()
7https://github.com/sfackler/rust-openssl/pull/519 Note how the introduc-
tion of this new API is immediately followed (though not preceded) by
discussions about API design and misuse resistance.
constructor. Though this is the right struct to instantiate, there
are no pointers towards the sign module that contains the
necessary main functions. Once found, the sign module even
has an extensive code example for HMAC which is one of
many in the documentation.
Signatures: Although the functions are mostly easy to use,
it can be difficult to find the right one (cf. finding the sign
module for HMAC). There are separate functions for AE and
non-AE ciphers but they both accept instances of the same
Cipher struct and an optional nonce. Therefore, the compiler
cannot prohibit nonsensical calls like using ECB mode with a
nonce, CBC mode without a nonce, a non-AE cipher with the
AE API or vice-versa. The former goes unnoticed entirely, a
missing nonce leads to a good error message during encryption
and the latter two just fail at encryption or decryption with a
confusing message.
API structure: rust-openssl contains cryptographic primi-
tives and a TLS implementation, though they are not notice-
ably separated. Some modules also use global functions for the
main operations, whereas others require the user to instantiate
a struct and call its functions.
Misuse resistance: Even though the signing API has a
Verifier that could take care of the constant-time comparison,
it does not work for HMACs. Not knowing about timing
attacks, the explorer implemented the comparison with ==.
When the AE tag is tampered with, the decryption function
returns an error instead of the plaintext – the API uses a Rust
enum to return either the plaintext or an error – which prevents
any accidental misuse.
E. rust_sodium
Version 0.1.2 was used for the exploratory study.
Documentation: The top-level documentation points straight
to the relevant modules and every module contains relevant
code examples.
Signatures: rust_sodium was by far the easiest to use
because the functions are rather high-level, use strong types for
their arguments (e.g. Key and Nonce) and there are generator
functions for these types in the same module. This type
safety also exposed the (actually bad) use of a single key
for encryption and HMAC, forcing the explorer to create two
instances from the same key material.
API structure: Every algorithm lives in its own module and
the modules for the same primitive have exactly the same
structure and are grouped in a top-level module which makes
switching algorithms easy. Switching to another encryption
cipher was not possible, however, because XSalsa20-Poly1305
is the only one. The many modules are generated by macros
(to avoid code duplication) which confused the intellij −rust
plugin so that code completion and navigation were not
available in the exploratory study.
Misuse resistance: rust_sodium prevents many misuses
through type safety and an opinionated selection of algorithms
(inherited from libsodium) that excludes insecure algorithms
and dangerous primitives like unauthenticated encryption. The
documentation even advises against using the hash and auth
(HMAC) modules “unless you know what you’re doing.”
There is a verify () function with internal constant-time com-
parison that is advertised through its positioning and the code
example, so that misuse is unlikely. When the AE tag is
tampered with, the decryption function fails and thus prevents
any accidental misuse.
F. octavo
Version 0.1.1 was used for the exploratory study.
Completeness: octavo does not implement AES, so the Cha-
Cha20 stream cipher was used in the first stage. The second
stage had to be skipped for the lack of AE or any other stream
cipher.
Documentation: Although the top-level documentation con-
tains extensive information about how a cryptosystem is de-
fined mathematically, about Kerckhoff’s Principle and about
what key lengths are secure, it does not inform about the
key/initialization vector (IV) lengths actually required by the
ChaCha20 cipher. Digging into the code (or trial and error)
revealed that they must be multiples of 32 bits; hence the
112 bits recommended for “medium-term protection” by the
documentation would not work. Otherwise, the encryption
and HMAC documentations are basically empty, whereas the
hashing part has good explanations, a code example and visible
warnings about insecure algorithms.
Signatures: All APIs require preallocated vectors for output
through &mut parameters but are otherwise easy to use.
API structure: octavo splits its functionality into several
crates and re-exports them through a central crate. This can
help reduce compile times and binary sizes but makes the code
and documentation more difficult to navigate. Like rust-crypto,
octavo uses generics to parameterize its Hmac implementation
with any hash algorithm. This makes the components nicely
composable but often requires the caller to use the unpleasant
“turbofish” operator.8
Misuse resistance: octavo does not provide a random num-
ber generator (RNG) or a constant-time comparison function.
The explorer used the rand crate instead and unknowingly
implemented a == comparison vulnerable to timing attacks.
G. General observations and summary
The explorer often had trouble preallocating the vectors for
&mut [u8] parameters (Rust’s out-parameters). There is a sim-
ple solution since March 2015: vec ![0; length ]. But before
that many Rust users were frustrated when allocating a vector
that some ridiculous solutions were suggested, including one
that requires two lines of code and an unsafe block9 (still the
accepted answer) or one that creates an infinite iterator and
collects it. The latter is still used in rust-crypto’s internal code
today which is why the explorer ended up with that solution. In
the case of ring, the input parameter is used for the output, too
but it needs to be extended to make room for the authentication
tag. Even ring’s own unit test10 uses a loop to push the right
8https://twitter.com/steveklabnik/status/659034597062262784
9http://stackoverflow.com/a/28209155
10https://github.com/briansmith/ring/blob/master/src/aead/aead.rs#L359
number of zeros to the end, rather than using the resize ()
method.
As evidenced by the previous paragraph, the explorer often
turned to the library’s own source code and particularly its unit
tests. It is reasonable to assume that other library users would
do the same, especially when no code examples are provided.
On the other hand, if suitable code examples were available,
they would help the user enormously, as they serve many
purposes at once that the documentation would otherwise have
to fulfill individually: point to the right API to use, recommend
sensible choices for algorithms and key lengths, explain the
order in which the functions must be called and illustrate how
the returned result can be used.
It should be pointed out that this explorative study is not
representative of all Rust crypto libraries, as it only covers
major primitive libraries. In particular, we did not investigate
any TLS libraries or the like. By selecting the major libraries
for the exploratory study, there is a bias towards further de-
veloped and polished libraries, though this bias appropriately
reflects the experience of the average crypto user in Rust.
Regarding RQ 2 we can see that there are libraries that
make a great effort to provide good usability (e.g. rust_sodium)
including the documentation, code examples and misuse re-
sistance. Still, the libraries (e.g. rust-crypto) that are not only
good wrappers around existing other libraries (like OpenSSL
or libsodium) lack in usability.
V. CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT
The usability of the crypto libraries should not only be
analyzed subjectively by a single person as in the previously
described exploratory study. Therefor we decided to further
evaluate the usability of the libraries with a controlled ex-
periment. In this experiment, we compared two of the major
cryptographic libraries using two groups who worked on the
same simple cryptographic task but each group had to use
a different library to solve the task. This gives us additional
answers to RQ2.
A. Design
Initially, we thought about comparing all of Rust’s major
libraries but due to the limited number of possible partici-
pants we had to choose two libaries: We skipped the oldest
rust-openssl library because its API intentionally mirrors the
OpenSSL API and instead chose the rust-crypto (0.2.36)
library which implements its primitives in Rust and is not
based on any other libraries, for the first group. Like rust-
openssl, rust-crypto does not focus on usable API design.
Quite the opposite, it is the main developer’s goal to “focus
on creating high quality implementations [. . . ] with idomatic
[sic], maximally powerful interfaces without making (too
many) concessions to ergonmics [sic]” (DaGenix 2015). For
the second group, we chose a more recent library called
ring (0.6.3) which uses the same algorithm implementations
(in C and assembler) as BoringSSL but provides an entirely
independent Rust API. ring is an interesting candidate because
the main developer wants it to be high-level and as usable and
“foolproof” as possible. During the experiment Rust (rustc)
was at version 1.15.0 (10893a9a3 2017-01-19).
B. Task and code skeleton
Due to time constraints (1 h 30 min including exit survey)
and experience from the exploratory study, we decided to
only offer one task: Add symmetric encryption to an artificial
application. The artificial application consists only of a main
method that gets business texts from a separate method (line
20) and should encrypt these texts (TODO comments in line
27–31) and then decrypt (TODO comments in line 41–45)
them again. The code skeleton for rust-crypto is shown below
(the one for ring is very similar except for the referenced crates
and use-statement for the random number generator (line 12).
1 #[macro_use] extern crate log;
2 extern crate log4rs;
3 extern crate rustc_serialize;
4 extern crate bufstream;
5 extern crate rand;
6
7 extern crate crypto;
8
9 mod business;
10
11 fn main() {
12 use rand::{Rng, os};
13
14 // Initialize the logger.
15 // You can produce logging outputs like this:
16 // info!("Here is a number: {}", 42)
17 log4rs::init_file("config/log4rs.yaml", Default::default
↪→ ()).unwrap();
18
19 // Retrieve the business text that should be encrypted.
20 let plain_business_text = business::
↪→ get_long_important_business_text(2);
21 info!("Plain text: {}", &plain_business_text);
22
23 // Create a copy of the plain text for later comparison
↪→ (do not use this variable in your code).
24 let copy_business_text = plain_business_text.clone();
25
26
27 /**
28 * ####################################
29 * # TODO Set up your ENCRYPTION here #
30 * ####################################
31 */
32
33 // Create Key, for example with:
34 // let key: [u8; <length in Bytes>] = os::OsRng::new().
↪→ unwrap().gen();
35 // For AES-256 the keylength is 256 bits, so 32 bytes.
36
37 let encrypted_text: &[u8] = &[0; 0]; // Instead of &[u8
↪→ ], Vec<u8> or String are also fine.
38 info!("Encrypted text: {:?}", &encrypted_text);
39
40
41 /**
42 * ###################################
43 * # TODO Set up the DECRYPTION here #
44 * ###################################
45 */
46
47 let decrypted_text: String = String::new();
48 info!("Decrypted text: {}", &decrypted_text);
49
50 // Output whether it worked:
51 info!("Original and decrypted texts match: {}",
↪→ copy_business_text == decrypted_text);
52 }
C. Hypothesis
Our empirical hypothesis follows from the selection criteria
described above: We expect ring to have a higher effectiveness,
efficiency and satisfaction than rust-crypto for Rust beginners.
We measure these three sub-factors of usability individually
as described in the following analysis sections. We derive the
following statistical hypotheses:
H0.effectiveness: There is no difference in effectiveness in using
ring and rust-crypto.
HA.effectiveness: ring usage is more effective than rust-crypto
usage.
H0.efficiency: There is no difference in efficiency in using ring
and rust-crypto.
HA.efficiency: ring usage is more efficient than rust-crypto
usage.
H0.satisfaction: There is no difference in satisfaction in using
ring and rust-crypto.
HA.satisfaction: ring usage is more satisfactory than rust-crypto
usage.
D. Sample
The controlled experiment was conducted with students
of the University of Osnabrück, who had just completed a
semester-long lecture on the Rust programming language.
Before we describe the sample, we exclude some of the
participant’s results because participants 3, 4, 6, 14 and 23 tried
to implement the Advanced Encryption Standard themselves
but failed. We ignore their data as they might have performed
differently if the task had been understood better. For the
same reason we discount participant 15 who implemented a
Caesar cipher (unsuccessful). We also disregard the data from
the supervisor (participant 13) of the course. This leaves 11
participants in both groups.
The remaining 22 participants were between 19 and 26 years
old (median 22.5) and most of them were male (seven were
female). Their course of study is mostly computer science (16)
but six were enrolled in cognitive science. All participants
described their knowledge of cryptography as No experience
or moderate experience. This is good, because we wanted
to see how programmers that are not very knowledgeable in
cryptography get along with cryptographic libraries. The rating
for the programming experience had most responses with I did
several projects with other programming languages (9) and the
Rust experience was described by most participants as I have
not used Rust before the lecture . . . (12).
E. Effectiveness
We divided the task into several subtasks that had to be done
to complete the overall task. These subtasks were weighted
differently depending on their difficulty which was determined
based on the experience from the exploratory study. The final
weighting is annotated in our task solution code in section V-I.
We denote the overall effectiveness with E ∈ [0, 1] and
calculated it as the mean of all participants’ effectiveness. The
effectiveness E ∈ [0, 1] of a participant was calculated as the
weighted sum of the completed subtasks. A subtask can either
be completed or not.
Calculating the effectiveness for each participant and sum-
ming it up to get a total effectiveness of the experiment sample
we got Erc = 0.66 for rust-crypto and Ering = 0.28 for ring.
The distributions for the effectiveness of the two libraries is
depicted in the top left boxplot in Figure 1.
The descriptive statistics already suggest that we will not
be able to reject H0.effectiveness. We used the Student’s t-test
(because a Shapiro–Wilk test showed that the distribution is
normal in both groups and the mean of the variance is equal
according to an F-test). The result of the t-test is a p-value
of 0.9966 which is much larger than our significance level of
0.05. Hence, we could not reject the null hypothesis that there
is no difference in the effectiveness of using rust-crypto and
ring.
F. Efficiency
The resources programmers can spend are manifold. A
common resource is time spent. We denote the time-based
efficiency with P ∈ Q and calculated it as the mean of all
participants time-based efficiencies. The time-based efficiency
P ∈ Q of a participant is calculated by the effectiveness E
divided by the time to completion or, in case of not completing
the task, divided by the time until the time limit was reached.
According to the definition, we calculated the time-based
efficiency for each participant and then calculated the mean to
get the overall efficiency. This led to an efficiency of P rc =
0.88 tasks/hour for rust-crypto and P ring = 0.30 tasks/hour
for ring. The distributions are shown in the boxplot in the top
middle of Figure 1.
Measuring the subtasks’ time is very inaccurate in itself,
because developers work on different subtasks at the same
time or it is not clear on which one they are currently working.
Therefore, we cannot report on the timing of subtasks.
The descriptive statistics again suggest that we cannot reject
this null hypothesis (H0.efficiency) either. We used the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test (because a Shapiro–Wilk test suggests the
sample distribution of rust-crypto’s group is not normal).
Again the large p-value 0.9953 is larger than our significance
level. Hence, we could not reject the null hypothesis that there
is no difference in the efficiency of using rust-crypto and ring.
G. Satisfaction
Satisfaction can be measured by standardized question-
naires. We used the System Usability Scale (SUS) by Brooke
[15] (similar to [13]) which is simple, quick and accurate [16]
as it contains only a set of 10 questions. It can be analyzed
with a simple formula and gives a SUS score in the range 0
to 100. We denote the overall satisfaction with S ∈ [0, 100]
and calculated it as the mean of all participants’ SUS scores.
An average SUS score is 68 [16].
The mean SUS scores for rust-crypto are Src = 50.68 and
ring’s mean SUS score is Sring = 33.64. The distribution of
the satisfaction of the two libraries is shown in the top right
boxplot in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Distributions of per-participant effectiveness, time-based efficiency and satisfaction, grouped by the used library (top row) and grouped by the
participants who used the example and the ones that did not for rust-crypto (bottom row).
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS FOR THE CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT
Effectiveness Efficiency Satisfaction
Library E ∈ [0, 1] P ∈ Q S ∈ [0, 100]
ring 0.28 0.30 tasks/hour 33.6
rust-crypto 0.66 0.88 tasks/hour 50.7
rust-crypto (with example) 0.82 1.15 tasks/hour 58.6
rust-crypto (without example) 0.38 0.39 tasks/hour 36.9
PyCrypto [13] - - 63.9
Keyczar [13] - - 40.9
Also here, the descriptive statistics suggest that we cannot
reject the third null hypothesis H0.satisfaction. We used the
Student’s t-test (because a Shapiro–Wilk test showed that the
distribution is normal in both groups and the mean of the
variances is equal according to a F-test). The resulting p-value
is 0.9792 and, hence, again far larger than our significance
level. We could not reject the null hypothesis that there is no
difference in the satisfaction in using rust-crypto and ring.
A summary of the results for the effectiveness, efficiency
and satisfaction of rust-crypto and ring is shown in table II.
H. Example code usage analysis
During the analysis we recognized that some participants
used a suitable code example from the documentation/code
repository of rust-crypto. Therefore, we compared the perfor-
mance of the participants who used that example code with the
ones that did not use it (just for rust-crypto participants). Only
4 of 7 (57%) who used the example code from/for rust-crypto,
completed the task. Participants who did not use the example
did not complete the task. We can calculate an effectiveness
of 0.82 for participants who used the example and only 0.38
for the others. The efficiency is 1.15 tasks/hour with example
code usage and 0.39 tasks/hour without using the example
code. The mean SUS scores for rust-crypto are 58.57 with
example code usage and 36.88 without using the example
code. The distribution of the values is shown in the bottom
row of Figure 1.
These observations let us conclude that it was mainly due
to the example code that rust-crypto users performed better,
as the participants who did not use the example code were
equally unsuccessful completing the task as the participants
who used ring.
I. Task solution code and partial effectiveness
Here we show the correct solutions that participants had
to program in the experiment. We also list the weights (per-
centage values in code comments) to get an idea of how
we specified the difficulty for the mentioned subtasks that
were used to create a more appropriate understanding of the
effectiveness in subsection V-E. As explained, participants
could use an example code for rust-crypto. Depending on the
usage, there are two possible task solutions.
If the example code is not used, the task solution looks like
this for rust-crypto:
1 let key: [u8; 256 / 8] = os::OsRng::new().unwrap().gen();
↪→ // [keygen; 5%]
2 let iv: [u8; 128 / 8] = os::OsRng::new().unwrap().gen();
↪→ // [nonce; 8%] (unless ECB is used)
3 // Instantiate encryptor with KeySize and padding [
↪→ ecb_encryptor/cbc_encryptor; 12%]
4 let mut encryptor = aes::cbc_encryptor(aes::KeySize::
↪→ KeySize256, &key, &iv, blockmodes::PkcsPadding);
5 // Allocate buffers [buffer; 20%]
6 let mut final_result = Vec::<u8>::new();
7 let mut read_buffer = buffer::RefReadBuffer::new(
↪→ plain_business_text.as_ref());
8 let mut buffer = [0; 4096];
9 let mut write_buffer = buffer::RefWriteBuffer::new(&mut
↪→ buffer);
10 // Call the block-wise API, possibly in a loop if the
↪→ block size is fixed [blockcall; 40%]
11 loop {
12 let result = encryptor.encrypt(&mut read_buffer, &mut
↪→ write_buffer, true).unwrap();
13 final_result.extend(write_buffer.take_read_buffer().
↪→ take_remaining().iter().map(|&i| i));
14 match result {
15 buffer::BufferResult::BufferUnderflow => break,
16 buffer::BufferResult::BufferOverflow => {}
17 }
18 }
19
20 // Do the same for decryption (works exactly analogously)
↪→ [decrypt; 10%]
21 let mut decryptor = aes::cbc_decryptor(aes::KeySize::
↪→ KeySize256, &key, &iv, blockmodes::PkcsPadding);
22 ...
23 let decrypted_text: String = String::from_utf8(
↪→ final_result).unwrap(); // [from_utf8; 5%]
We can see for example that we assigned a weight of 40%
for the loop block (lines 11–18) that repeatedly applies the
needed encryption steps for a block-wise encryption method
which must be used. As the concept of block-wise encryption
must be understood and applied, we assumed (and observed
in the screen recordings) a higher difficulty.
If the example code is used, the task solution looks like this
for rust-crypto:
1 // Place a copy of the encrypt() and decrypt() functions
↪→ from the code example into a separate module, into
2 // the main module or into the main() function (or
↪→ anywhere else where they are accessible).
3
4 let key: [u8; 256 / 8] = os::OsRng::new().unwrap().gen();
↪→ // [keygen; 20%]
5 let iv: [u8; 128 / 8] = os::OsRng::new().unwrap().gen();
↪→ // [nonce; 30%]
6 let encrypted_text = encrypt(plain_business_text.as_bytes
↪→ (), &key, &iv).unwrap(); // [call; 10%]
7
8 let decrypted_text = decrypt(&encrypted_text, &key, &iv).
↪→ unwrap(); // [decrypt; 10%]
9 let decrypted_text: String = String::from_utf8(
↪→ decrypted_text).unwrap(); // [from_utf8; 30%]
This solution requires visibly less code because it calls meth-
ods (encrypt and decrypt) which are copied from the
example code and effectively offer a more convenient API for
the participants who used the example code.
For ring, the task solution looks like this:
1 // [keygen, 5%]
2 let mut key_bytes = [0; 32];
3 SystemRandom::new().fill(&mut key_bytes).unwrap();
4 // nonce generation (participant needs to decide for
↪→ random nonce) [nonce 8%]
5 let mut nonce = [0; 12];
6 SystemRandom::new().fill(&mut nonce).unwrap();
7 let sealing_key = aead::SealingKey::new(&aead::AES_256_GCM
↪→ , &key_bytes).unwrap(); // [SealingKey, 7%]
8 // Allocate a buffer for the in_out parameter, filled with
↪→ the plaintext and
9 // a further max_overhead_len empty bytes for the tag. [
↪→ in_out, 40%]
10 let mut buffer = plain_business_text.into_bytes();
11 let newsize = buffer.len() + aead::AES_256_GCM.
↪→ max_overhead_len();
12 buffer.resize(newsize, 0u8);
13 let encrypted_length = aead::seal_in_place(
14 &sealing_key, &nonce, &mut buffer,
15 aead::AES_256_GCM.max_overhead_len(), // set
↪→ out_suffix_capacity to max_overhead_len [out-
↪→ suffix, 5%]
16 &[] // set ad to an empty slice as there is no additional
↪→ data [ad, 10%]
17 ).unwrap();
18
19 let encrypted_text = &buffer[..encrypted_length]; //
↪→ truncate the return value to the right length [
↪→ truncate, 10%]
20
21 // Apply the knowledge gained from coding the above to
↪→ implement the symmetrically structured decryption.
↪→ [decrypt, 10%]
22 let opening_key = aead::OpeningKey::new(&aead::AES_256_GCM
↪→ , &key_bytes).unwrap();
23 let mut buffer = encrypted_text.to_vec();
24 let text_length = aead::open_in_place(&opening_key, &nonce
↪→ , 0, &mut buffer, &[]).unwrap();
25 // call from_utf8 to convert back to a String [from_utf8,
↪→ 5%]
26 let decrypted_text: String = String::from_utf8(buffer[..
↪→ text_length].to_vec()).unwrap();
In this solution we assigned a high difficulty (weight 40%) to
the allocation and initialization of a buffer of specific length
that is later needed by ring’s seal_in_place method.
J. General observations
Besides the quantitative data presented above, we made nu-
merous observations when watching the screen recordings and
also during discussions with participants after the experiment.
Most of them only apply to a small number of participants
because the overall group size was not large already but these
issues appear common enough to probably affect other users,
as well.
Security: Not a single participant was worried about the
security implications of their choices during the experiment.
Everyone went with the defaults provided by the library and
tried to get something working. Those who succeeded did not
reconsider earlier choices. Accordingly, the participants were
rather unsure about the security of their code. In particular, all
rust-crypto users ended up using unauthenticated encryption
without knowing its potential dangers and the vast majority
stuck to the CBC mode and PKCS padding given by the
code example. The code example also made rust-crypto users
more confident in the perceived security of their solution,
whereas those who did not use it were as unsure as the ring
users. This is in contrast to the fact that, if finished, the ring
implementations would have been more secure because they
forcibly use authenticated encryption. Besides one ECB usage,
the only insecurity we found were nonces filled with zeros
rather than random data (4 times).
Nonce and other parameters: ring users struggled to provide
data for the nonce and ad parameters, as the documentation
does not explain them. Besides finding the nonce length on the
Algorithm struct instances which most did, the participants had
to figure out that it needs to be random or at least unique. 3
out of 8 participants who reached this point used zeros instead
and one generated a new random nonce for the decryption.
The ad parameter takes the additional data for AEAD ciphers
which does not exist in this experiment and should be left
empty (simply &[]). Some figured this out but others supplied
seemingly arbitrary values to the parameter like the entire
plaintext (again), the nonce or even the encryption key. Hence,
a library’s documentation should explain every parameter,
especially if it is security-critical.
Information sources: Besides the official documenta-
tion of the libraries (briansmith.org, docs.rs and
ironframeweork.io) and of Rust (rust-lang.org), a
relatively large number of participants also visited Wikipedia
and StackOverflow to learn about AES encryption, nonces
and other topics. While some participants drove their web
research through Rust-specific sites (mostly crates.io and
docs.rs), others relied heavily on web search engines.
Usage of code examples: While a few participants copied
the entire rust-crypto code example and then went ahead using
the higher-level API that it exposes, the majority treated code
examples differently. The participants tried to make sense
of the code and apply it to their situation. Consequently,
they initially only copied short sequences or typed analogous
code themselves. This shows that code examples are treated
differently from code hidden behind a library API: users
want to understand it and they expect to adjust it. Therefore,
code examples should be short and understandable. If a code
example gets too long and even exposes its own API, as in
the case of rust-crypto, it should better be part of the library’s
primary API, so that users do not worry about understanding
it.
In-place APIs are difficult: Most ring users failed because of
the time limit, that is, they did not head in the wrong direction
but they had too many obstacles to overcome. The most time-
consuming obstacles for ring users was its in_out parameter.11
The library user needs to supply a byte slice to the encryption
function which begins with the plaintext and has extra space
at the end. Thus, participants had to convert the given string
into a vector and resize it accordingly. The encryption function
then overwrites the given data with the ciphertext and returns
the length of the ciphertext. Thus, the participants had to use
the returned length to truncate the vector and then treat it as
the ciphertext. This kind of in-place API has a number of
benefits: it does not require extra heap allocations on the part
of the library – some environments do not have a heap, so
this can be a hard requirement – and it uses minimal extra
memory, as the plaintext can be overwritten. The particular
format implemented by ring (appending the tag and supporting
a “prefix” in the decryption function) is useful for certain
applications. On the other hand, the usability of this API
design is poor. The API exposed by the code example of rust-
11Note that the documentation was not as detailed at the time. The version
used by the participants is: https://docs.rs/ring/0.6.3/ring/aead/fn.open_in_
place.html
crypto is more high-level in comparison. Among other things,
it works “out-of-place” and returns a newly allocated vector
with the ciphertext. As only rust-crypto users who copied the
code example were successful and ring users spent much time
figuring out the in_out parameter, we conclude that such in-
place APIs are unnecessarily complicated for the average user
and should always be complemented with a higher-level, out-
of-place API. At the time of writing, ring has already improved
its existing API and the author is working on an out-of-place
API, as well.
K. Interpretation
Surprisingly, we found that the participants who used rust-
crypto were more successful than the ring users. We could not
reject a single null hypothesis. We assume this is largely due
to the extensive code example provided by rust-crypto which
is the only code example that the library has but it exactly fits
the particular use case. Despite the random assignment of the
library we found a difference between both groups regarding
the Rust experience. The participants who used the supposedly
less usable library rust-crypto had more experience with Rust
than the other group. So this could also be the cause of the
better performance.
The SUS scores for both ring (33.64) and rust-crypto
(50.68) are well below the common average SUS score of
68 [16] and testify these libraries a bad satisfaction for the
programmer. Slightly higher SUS scores were observed by
Acar et al. [13] for python libraries of 63.9 for PyCrypto and
40.9 for Keyczar for example. Also, the effectiveness scores
for the rather simple task of adding symmetric encryption to
a program are low at 0.66 for rust-crypto and 0.28 for ring.
Efficiency has similar differences. From the comments about
the experiment we also get “Did I mention that I missed a
good documentation for rust-crypto?” and “The ring library
desperately needs a good documentation with examples”.
This suggests that the documentation has a lot of room for
improvement.
L. Threats to validity
Regarding the statistical conclusion validity, we are certain
that we regarded the assumptions of the applied statistical tests
and we did not violate the Type 1 and Type 2 errors in our
hypothesis testing. Accordingly, we think our measures were
reliable overall. As far as the arbitrary weighting and definition
of subtasks go, we assume that others would define it in a
similar way, not changing our results.
A big threat to our internal validity is the major factor for
the unexpected performance difference: The available code
example for rust-crypto. Despite its availability we think that
this can also be seen as a major factor influencing the usability
of the API as we discuss in subsection V-J. Another threat is
the screen recording which was necessary for our analysis. We
mitigated concerns by describing that the recordings will not
contain any personal or other data that lets us connect it to a
specific participant.
The external validity is jeopardized at least for the gen-
eralization. The participants were students who had little
programming experience. Regarding cryptographic knowledge
we argue that this should be observable with more experienced
programmers as well, so this is no big threat for the conclu-
sions we draw. The time constraints limit the generalizability,
because in reality programmers can spend more time on
solving such a task.
VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Viewing the current Rust crypto APIs in the light of recent
research, we found that: Insecure defaults do not occur and
most APIs try to avoid defaults entirely. Authenticated encryp-
tion is not advertised enough in low-level libraries, whereas the
high-level libraries omit unauthenticated encryption altogether
for maximal misuse resistance. Few high-level libraries are
available. A few projects do not warn about deprecated/broken
algorithms. There are no measures against accidental nonce
reuse. Documentation and example code range from absent or
scarce in the low-level libraries to excellent (in sodiumoxide).
These usability problems can be remedied in several both
technical and non-technical ways. We recommend the follow-
ing:
1) Use a prominent location to link to the documentation.
E.g. at the start page of the repository.
2) Create the first line of the module description carefully
because it is used in the summary of modules.
3) Do not explain cryptographic concepts yourself but
link to comprehensible resources.
4) Mention scenarios where the algorithm should be
used because non-experts might not select the appropriate
algorithm for their use case.
5) Mention closely related keywords, as developers have
different knowledge about cryptographic terms.
6) Point out known weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Even
if the crypto API still offers weak or vulnerable algo-
rithms, they should be clearly marked as such to prevent
usage.
7) Explain all parameters. A lot of mistakes are made
by providing wrong or insecure parameters. E. g. key:
length in bits and bytes (the former is easier to recognize
and remember, the latter is what users need in their code)
or where the length can be found, possibly a pointer to
a key generation function.
8) Make recommendations when there are multiple
choices. E.g. if parameters can be constructed differently,
it should be explained what the different choices imply.
9) Provide high-level APIs for common scenarios. Similar
to the recommendation by Green and Smith [10] that non-
crypto APIs should include and/or hide cryptographic
functionality, a step in this direction is that the crypto
APIs do this themselves.
10) Promote the use of constant time comparison. In Rust
this can be done by implementing the PartialEq trait to
override ==).
11) Hide low-level APIs in a separate API layer called
"hazardous materials". By naming it like this, devel-
opers take notice that they might be doing something
dangerous.
12) Provide example code for the most important use cases
at module level. As can be seen in our experiment the
usability and comprehension of the API can be improved
by offering example code that demonstrates the usage.
13) Maintain example code the same way as security-
relevant code, as examples are a common entry point
to understand the API or to quickly get to a solution. If
they lack behind the API, the changes in the API might
not be noticed or understood by developers.
Compared to Green and Smith’s top ten principles [10], our
recommendations are more specific but do not conflict with
their suggestions.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The usability of cryptographic APIs has a significant impact
on the security of the applications using them. As APIs are
designed in the early stages of a library, it is the right time to
investigate the young, emerging crypto libraries for the Rust
programming language.
RQ 1 (Which are the major libraries in the ecosystem?)
is sufficiently covered by our systematic search in section III.
The major Rust libraries for cryptographic primitives are: rust-
openssl, rust-crypto, sodiumoxide/rust_sodium, octavo, ring
and RustCrypto. Regarding RQ 2 (How usable are the current
Rust cryptographic libraries?) we learned from the exploratory
study that the two oldest and most widespread libraries rust-
openssl and rust-crypto have an API that is intended to be low-
level and powerful sacrificing usability. But there are equally
many libraries with a clear focus on usability. sodiumoxide
and thus rust_sodium inherit the high-level interface from the
underlying libsodium library and augment it with a “rustic”
API that makes visible efforts towards usability. ring is based
on the lower-level BoringSSL library but makes usability an
explicit design goal and sacrifices backward compatibility for
it. Currently, ring is not quite as easy to use as sodiumox-
ide but it is already relatively misuse-resistant and under
heavy development to improve its usability. Consequently
the usability and misuse resistance of the current libraries
also varies, with the most usable libraries for cryptographic
primitives being sodiumoxide and ring. Still, the controlled
experiment found a rather bad usability for both the usability-
focused ring and rust-crypto. Especially ring that had the
explicit goal of usability performed worse than rust-crypto.
The counterintuitive result of our experiment is that none of
the ring users completed the task, whereas rust-crypto users
were successful in 4 out of 11 cases. This success, however,
was mostly only due to a fitting code example provided in
rust-crypto’s repository and we found no relevant differences
between ring users and rust-crypto users who did not use
the code example. Nevertheless, having fitting code examples
for common use cases is important. As often the examples
are used to explore the API faster. Additionally, interesting
observations were made about the developers. E. g. they
are not worried about their choices regarding the security
and many were slowed by obstacles originating from the
crypto API. We derived major recommendations from these
observations and the exploratory study which concern the
detail and structure of the documentation, higher-level APIs
and selected, good-quality example code.
The next step for us is the proposition of good example
code for the major Rust cryptographic libraries. We intend
to provide the examples directly within the documentation of
the libraries but also via the CryptoExamples [17] platform.
Further, we are in touch with the developers of the libraries
to implement the recommendations that we made.
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